Abstract-In existing schemes for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages, the security of S-BGP and BGPSEC has received wide acceptance. Yet, in S-BGP or BGPSEC, the number of signatures in a route attestation is linear in the length of AS-PATH, which is one of major hurdles of deploying in the real world and thus is an important and urgent problem. Existing schemes for solving this problem reduce the number of signatures by using aggregate signatures. Yet, its computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is too heavy. In this paper, we present a scheme for reducing the number of signatures by using aggregate signatures, whose computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH can be significantly lowered. The presented scheme combines aggregate signature and Rabin signature. By it, the number of signatures in a route attestation is only one because aggregate signature is used. Moreover, differing from the existing aggregate-signature based schemes, the computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is roughly only one multiplication each hop because Rabin signature is used. Computation overhead of verifying in presented scheme is roughly 1/2400 of that of existing scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are various threats in the Internet. One of top known threats on today's Internet is the falsifying of update message of BGP (Border Gateway Protocol), which mainly includes IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering [1] . The AS-PATH tampering stems from one of BGP vulnerabilities.
The BGP [2] is the sole inter-domain routing protocol operating in today's Internet. Routers who run BGP are known as BGP speakers. Each BGP speaker communicates with other BGP speakers [1] [2] . Currently, there are about 4,3000 ASs (Autonomous Systems) in the Internet [3] . ASs exchange routing information through update messages. The two most important parts of an update message are: (1) address prefixes, which are destinations of advertised inter-domain paths; (2) the AS-PATH, which is an attribute of update message and used to specify a sequence of ASs along the path each identified by its AS number.
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In BGP, each AS prepends itself AS number to the AS-PATH when propagating an update message to a neighboring AS.
However, BGP's update messages are hardly authenticated when broadcasting among ASs, which leaves an opportunity for malicious attackers to fabricate false update messages by tampering the address prefixes or AS-PATH attribute. AS-PATH tampering occurs when the value of AS-PATH attribute is falsified.
The AS-PATH tampering can be illustrated by Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 , the true AS-PATH advertised by AS 5 should be "AS 0 ∥AS 2 ∥AS 3 ∥AS 5 ", where "∥" denotes a character used to connect two separated strings. Yet, AS 5 , who is assumed to be malicious attacker, tampers this AS-PATH and advertises the tampered AS-PATH which is "AS 0 ∥AS 5 ". As a result of this attack, the AS 6 and AS 7 are polluted because a shorter path is more prefered. Their traffic aimed to advertised prefixes, which should traverse through AS 4 , will be mistakenly sent to AS 5 .
This kind of attack can cause anything from an inconsequential annoyance to a devastating communications failure. For example, in critical applications (such as online banking, stock trading, and telemedicine run over the Internet), significant harm may arise if communication is lost at a crucial moment.
In existing schemes for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages, asymmetric cryptography based solutions have a great effect [1] [5] [4] , some typical schemes of which are S-BGP [6] , soBGP [18] , psBGP [19] , SPV [10] [5], BGPSEC [7] [9] [8] and so on.
In these schemes, the security of S-BGP [4] and BGPSEC [8] has received wide acceptance. The security is obviously the most important factor when designing schemes for authenting AS-PATH. In order to provide satisfying security, the direct reference scheme of the presented scheme is S-BGP or BGPSEC. Next, we further introduce the S-BGP or BGPSEC.
In S-BGP or BGPSEC, a digital signature will be created in each hop of AS-PATH. The number of signatures in a route attestation is linear in the length of the AS-PATH [5] . A route attestation in update message, which consists of several digital signatures signed by each AS when the update message traverses through this AS, is to protect AS-PATH. When an update message includes so many signatures, it will be significantly lengthened. Thus, S-BGP or BGPSEC improves security at the cost of significant lengthened update messages, which is one of major hurdles of deploying in the real world and thus is an important and urgent problem [6] .
To solve above problem of S-BGP or BGPSEC, some documents manage to reduce the number of signatures by using aggregate signatures. Yet, these suggests mainly focus on the method based on bilinear map, whose computation overhead is too heavy [11] .
For example, in a typical suggest [11] , the general aggregate signature approach is based on a co-GDH signature scheme, which can be based on any gap group. The short signature scheme by Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS) is one such co-GDH signature scheme that makes use of elliptic curves. However, the computation overhead of this scheme is at least 10 times that of common schemes [5] .
Aggregate signature based on RSA is simply mentioned [11] . However, RSA-aggregate-based scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages is not given. Even if this kind of scheme is given, the computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is roughly 15 multiplications each hop because RSA is used. Overall, in existing scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages by using aggregate signatures, computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is too heavy.
In this paper, we present a scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages by using aggregate signatures, whose computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH can be significantly lowered. The presented scheme combines aggregate signature and Rabin signature. By it, the number of signatures in a route attestation, which is linear in the length of the AS-PATH in S-BGP or BGPSEC, is only one because aggregate signature is used. Moreover, differing from the existing aggregate-signature based schemes, the computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is roughly only one multiplication each hop because Rabin signature is used. The pairing calculations in existing scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages, whose computation overhead is too heavy, are avoided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Rabin signature and the concept of aggregate signature are simply introduced in Section II. Our scheme for protecting AS-PATH by combining aggregate signature and Rabin signature is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we evaluate the presented scheme. Related work is simply introduced in section V. Finally, we present the conclusions and future work in Section VI.
II. PREREQUISITE KNOWLEDGE
The prerequisite knowledge introduced in this section includes the concept of aggregate signature and the Rabin signature.
A. The concept of aggregate signature
An aggregate signature is a digital signature that supports aggregation: given n signatures on n distinct messages by n distinct users using an aggregate signature algorithm, it is possible to aggregate these signatures into a single short signature. This single signature (and the n original messages) will convince the verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages [11] [17] .
B. The Rabin signature
The Rabin public-key signature scheme uses an even public exponent e. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that e = 2.
In Rabin signature scheme described as following, the square root computation in the step 2 of signature generation is comparable to an exponentiation modulo n [12] . Rabin signature generation is not significantly more computationally intensive than an RSA signature generation with the same modulus size. Rabin signature verification is very fast when e = 2; it requires only one modular multiplication [12] . For the sake of its efficiency of verification, we use the Rabin signature to design the presented method of AS-PATH authentication.
The Rabin signature scheme is as follows. Note that the function R( ) called redundancy function, is a 1-1 mapping from message space to signature space.
The Rabin signature scheme [12] Key generation 1. Generate two large distinct random primes p and q, each roughly the same size. 2. Compute n = pq 3. The public key is n; The private key is (p, q) Signature generation entity A signs a message m. Any entity B can verify A's signature and recover the message m from the signature. Entity A should do the following: 1. Compute Rm = R(m) 2. Compute s, which is a square root of Rm mod n (note that this square root can not be computed if the private key is not known). In other words, s = (R(m)) 0.5 mod n. Multiplications, which commonly play the most improtant role in computation overhead of signature and verification [12] , are solely used calculations when we roughly compute computation overhead. From above description of Rabin scheme, we can see that there is only one multiplication when verifying a Rabin signature. The presented scheme can be divided into two parts: (1) The first part is to create a route attestation. A route attestation, which is to protect AS-PATH, consists of several digital signatures signed by each AS when the update message traverses through this AS. By using aggregate signature, these signatures are aggregated into a single signature. (2) The second part is to verify the route attestation, which is executed by AS i .
III. THE SCHEME FOR PROTECTING AS-PATH
When an AS receives a path announcement from lasthop AS, it should verify the sequence of relationship marks besides origin AS and AS-PATH by using related public keys. The presented method includes two algorithms. The first algorithm is executed on senders, the second one is executed on receivers. These two algorithms are as Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Next, we describe these two parts as follows. Some abbreviations in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 can be seen in Table 1 .
A. Creating a route attestation
Algorithm 1: ASi creating a route attestation 1. Create the AS-PATHi, which is "AS0 ∥AS1 ∥AS2 ∥...∥ASi+1" 2. Create the signed message, which is "si−1" ⊕AS-PATHi 3. Compute Rm = R("si−1" ⊕AS-PATHi) 4. Compute si, which is a square root of Rm mod ni, by using itself private key (pi, qi). In other words, si = (R("si−1" ⊕AS-PATHi)) 0.5 mod ni. 5. Send AS-PATHi and si to ASi+1. Note that si is an aggregate signature as well as current route attestation Figure 2 shows a typical process for AS-PATH and a route attestation transporting. In this figure, AS and so on. Note that s −1 is assumed to be 0. This assumed value will be used to judge whether verification of route attestation succeeds or not, which can be seen in the Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Next, by refering Fig. 2 and respective describing actions of various ASs in AS-PATH, we illustrate this inherent aggregating process in Algorithm 1.
(1) The action of AS 0 : The initial value is s −1 which is assumed to be 0. In the beginning, the AS 0 , which is origin AS of prefix i , creates AS-PATH 0 according to the Step 1 of Algorithm 1. Obviously, the AS-PATH 0 is "AS 0 ". After executing the Step 2 of Algorithm 1, AS 0 has created the signed message s −1 ⊕AS-PATH 0 , which is 0 ⊕"AS 0 ". After executing the Step 3 and Step 4, AS 0 has created initial route attestation, which is 
After executing the Step 3 and Step 4, AS i has created its route attestation, which is
AS i sends AS i+1 an update message including s i and AS-PATH i .
Formula (3) is a recusion formula, the recusive end point of which is formula (1) . In order to get formula of s i for general term, we can iterate s i from s i−1 to s −1 as following. 
= (R(((R(s i−2 ⊕ AS-PATH
i−1 )) 0.5 mod n i−1 ) ⊕ AS-PATH i )) 0.5 mod n i ......
= (R(((R(((R(0 ⊕AS-PATH
From formula (3) or formula (4), we can see that the length of s i is equal to that of n i . The n i , which is the public key of AS i , is about 1024 bits long. From formula (4), we can see that the s i aggregates all of previous route attestations by iteratively aggregating. Thus, s i is an aggregate signature which is about 1024 bits long. Note that a single short signature is also about 1024 bits long.
Therefore, by Algorithm 1, it is achieved to aggregate many signatures into a single short signature, and thus the size of related signed data can be significantly lowered and the bandwidth of update messages is low. Next, by Algorithm 2, we will see this single signature (and the n original messages) can convince the verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages.
B. Verifying a route attestation
The AS i draws AS-PATH i−1 and s i−1 from received update message. In order to recover s −1 and make a judgement according to s −1 , the aggregate signature s i−1 should be peeled layer by layer according to Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, the "cpath", " then {we can draw a conclusion that the verification of route attestation succeeds} else {we can draw a conclusion that this verification fails and the update message should be rejected} 
Endif

IV. EVALUATE
In this section, we evaluate the presented scheme according to the security and the number of signatures in a route attestation.
A. Secure evaluation
Shown as Formula (4), current route attestation s i is actually an aggregate signature. The verification of s i , which is detailly described by Algorithm 2, can convince that each of ASs in AS-PATH did indeed signs various corresponding message and the signing process is in full compliance with Algorithm 1. So, if only verifiers strictly execute Algorithm 2, each AS in AS-PATH has to sign its corresponding AS-PATH according to Algorithm 1. Otherwise, verifications executed by these verifiers can not succeed.
Therefore, the presented scheme is secure and can protect AS-PATH attributes of update messages.
B. The number of signatures in a route attestation
As shown in Section I, in S-BGP or BGPSEC, the number of signatures in a route attestation is linear in the length of the AS-PATH, which is an important and urgent problem.
Shown as Formula (4), in presented scheme, the number of signatures in a route attestation is one. In existing aggregate signature based scheme [11] for protecting AS-PATH, the number of signatures in a route attestation is only one, which is same as the presented scheme.
Therefore, benefitting from aggregate signature, existing scheme [11] and presented scheme can all solve above problem inherent in S-BGP or BGPSEC.
C. Computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH
Existing related schemes are based on bilinear map, whose computation overhead is too heavy [11] . The computation overhead of a bilinear map is roughly 10 common exponentiations, which roughly consists of 2,400 common multiplications [5] .
In presented scheme, shown as Algorithm 2, the computation overhead of verification each hop is roughly one multiplication. This one multiplication is from the statement "r = s 2 j mod n j " which is component of verification of Rabin signature.
Therefore, computation overhead of verifying in presented scheme is only 1/2400 of that of existing scheme.
Aggregate signature based on RSA is simply mentioned in current document [11] . However, RSA-aggregate-based scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes is not given. Even if this kind of scheme is given, the computation overhead of authenticating AS-PATH is roughly 15 multiplications each hop because RSA signature is used, which is 15 times as much as that of presented scheme.
The propogation delay is mainly up to the computation overhead of authenticating AS-PATH. We use the SSFNet (Scalable Simulation Framework) simulation tool to compare the propogation delay of existing mechanisms and that of our mechanism. The simulation result is as Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . From above result shown as Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , we can see that propogation delay in the proposed scheme is much lower than that of existing related schemes. [20] . In these schemes, asymmetric cryptography based solutions have a great effect, some typical schemes of which are S-BGP [6] , soBGP [18] , psBGP [19] , SPV [10] [5], BGPSEC [7] [9] [8] and so on.
S-BGP [6] implements security by validating path attributes in update messages passed among ASes through the use of digital signatures and associated public key certificates.
The soBGP [18] , psBGP [19] , SPV [10] aim at relieving the burden of S-BGP. Yet, the relieving brings about unacceptable loss of security. Thus, the scheme, whose security has received wide acceptance, is only S-BGP [4] and BGPSEC [8] . To a great extent, BGPSEC [8] can be regarded as the reiterating and refining for the AS-PATH authentication of S-BGP. The security is obviously the most important factor when designing schemes for authenting AS-PATH. Next, we further introduce the S-BGP or BGPSEC. In S-BGP or BGPSEC, route attestations, which are digital signatures and are used to protect the AS-PATH, are distributed in a modified update message as a new attribute. A route attestation is signed by each AS as it traverses the network. All ASs on the path sign previously attached signatures. Hence, the validator can validate not only the path, but also that (1) the ASs were traversed in the order indicated by the path, and (2) no intermediate ASs were added or removed by an adversary. fig. 6 shows a simplified use of route attestations as they propagate between ASs [5] .
In S-BGP or BGPSEC, the whole AS-PATH authentication can be divided into two parts. (1) The first part is to create a route attestation, which is digital signatures signed by each AS when the update message traverses through this AS. A typical singed message is the "current AS-PATH∥current AS#", where "∥" is a separator. (2) The second part is to verify a route attestation, which is executed by current AS.
According to fig. 6 , we can know in each hop of AS-PATH, a digital signature will be created. As a result, the AS 5 will receive 3 signatures from AS 4 or from AS 3 , and will send 4 signatures to its downstream neighbors. The number of signatures in a route attestation is linear in the length of the AS-PATH [5] . When an update message includes so many signatures, it will be significantly lengthened. Thus, S-BGP or BGPSEC improves security at the cost of significant lengthened update messages, which is one of major hurdles of deploying S-BGP in the real world and thus is an important and urgent problem [6] .
To solve above problem of S-BGP or BGPSEC, some documents manage to reduce the number of signatures by using aggregate signatures. Yet, these suggests mainly focus on the method based on pairing calculations, whose computation overhead is too heavy [11] . Aggregate signature based on RSA is simply mentioned [11] . However, RSA-aggregate-based scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages is not given. Even if this kind of scheme is given, the computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is roughly 15 multiplications each hop because RSA is used. Overall, in existing scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages by using aggregate signatures, computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is too heavy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, by combining aggregate signature and Rabin signature, we present a lightweight scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages. Its computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is only roughly one multiplication each hop because Rabin signature is used. Its number of signatures in a route attestation is only one because aggregate signature is used. Comparing with existing scheme for protecting AS-PATH attributes of update messages by using aggregate signature, the computation overhead of verifying AS-PATH is significantly lowered.
Future work will cover the extension of the presented scheme from AS-PATH authentication to origin AS authentication, so as to achieve a whole lightweight scheme for securing BGP. The aggregate signature will also be used in the whole scheme.
